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This paper uses income-smoothing methodology in order to examine 
whether the existence o.lwindow dressing behavior affects the operating and 
market perlormance offirms that go public in the Athens j Stock Exchange 
(ASE). The results depict that the window dressing behavior is unpopular 
among Greek IPO firms . The qfter-market pelformance of IPO firms in 
Greece reveals that issuers use underpricing as a means to signal their qual-
ity to the market. In addition, the findings posit that investors do not over-
react to past earnings growth and that the window dressing assumption is 
unable to explain the post-issue performance of IPO .firm~ in Greece. Fi-
nally, the results indicate that the market exhibits the ability to anticipate 
intentional income-smoothing behavior and classifies smQothing firms to 
higher risk classes. 
Key words: 
IPOs, under-perlormance, income smoothing, over-reaction to past 
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1. Introduction 
The long-term operating and market performance of Initial Public Offer-
ings (IPOs) has been a quite puzzling topic of research in c9rporate finance. 
Many studies in the area report results, which are not always consistent even 
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when they are b~sed upon data sets from the same or similar institutional 
environments, 
In particular, some findings posit that prior to going public, IPO firms 
exhibit increasing rates of earnings growth. In the post-IPO period, however, 
earnings growth tends to mean revert and the performance of IPO firms dete-
riorates over time. The findings also suggest that the declining operating per-
fonnance of IPO firms cannot be attributed to the lack of oppOliunities for 
sales growth or to cutbacks in post-IPO capital expenditures (Patel et at., 
1993; Jain and Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998). 
Additional results depict that the IPO firms deliver high stock returns in 
the early post-IPO period. However, the initial high returns gradually deterio-
rate and thus the long-run performance of IPOs displays a declining pattern 
(Ritter, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Dharan and 
Ikenberry, 1995; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997). 
Finally, Jain and Kini find that operating performance relates to owner-
ship control, in the sense that IPO firms where entrepreneurs retain higher 
ownership generally demonstrate superior performance as compared to other 
issuing firms. 
The explanation provided for these results has come to be known as the 
'w indow dressing hypothesis' and states that managers attempt to window-
dress their accounting numbers prior to going public. Therefore, the pre-issue 
operating performance of IPO firms is overstated as compared to the post-
IPO performance. On the other hand, the market does not understand that 
earnings growth tends to mean revert and investors are constantly surprised 
by the poor post~issue operating performance of IPO firms. As the market 
gradually recognizes its mistakes, the over-reaction to past earnings growth 
(the high initial returns) is corrected slowly in the future and the stock price 
performance of IPO fiTms deteriorates over time (Jain and Kini, 1994). This 
explanation has also been shown to have an empirical content by Teoh et al. 
(1998a) who evidence that opportunistic (discretionary) earnings manage-
ment in the IPO year relates to the poor market performance in the post-IPO 
period. 
This perceived market anomaly has gained some support among re-
searchers. However, its generalizability has been questioned by some rela-
tively recent empirical findings. In particular, Mikkelson et al (1997) and 
Beaver et al (2000) fail to document declining operating perforn1ance pat-
terns in the post-IPQ period. Moreover, Mikkelson et al find that the operat-
ing perfonnance is unrelated to ownership control. On the other hand, Beaver 
et al show that the existence of earnings management around IPO years can-
not be attributed to discretionary behavior of management over accruals. 
What they believe is that the decision to go public is related to factors , such 
as peak in sales and high earnings growth. These factors may cause a firm's 
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accruals to appear extreme and thus signal the existence of earnings man-
agement. Finally, Brav and Gompers, (1997) and Fama (1998) show that the 
market under-performance phenomenon is not an exclusive IPO effect but 
applies also to small-size and low book-to-market firms irrespective of 
whether they are IPO finns or not. 
The present paper expands on the findings of the above mentioned stud-
ies and elaborates on the long-run operating and market performance of IPO 
firms in Greece. In particular, the paper examines whether Greek IPO firms 
display intentional window dressing behavior both in the pr~-IPO and in the 
post-IPO period. In addition, the paper looks into the iIT1pact of window 
dressing behavior on both the operating and market perfonilance of IPOs in 
Greece. Finally, the paper tests whether the operating per(onnance of IPO 
fim1s plays any role in determining market performance ar;td whether addi-
tional factors such as firm-size and book-to-market ratios help explaining the 
evolution of the long-run market performance ofIPO firms i~ Greece. 
The paper uses a data set of 38 IPOs made in Greece during the three-
year period from 1-1-1990 to 3 1-12-1992. The variable set consists of finan-
cia I statement information and share price information over a ten-year pe-
riod, which plots around the actual IPO year (four years prior and five years 
after the actual IPO year). For simplicity, window dressing behavior is repli-
cated by income smoothing which in the relevant literature prevails as a form 
of earnings management l . Sample firms are classified as income smoothers 
and non-smoothers using the methodology prescribed in Michelson et af. 
(1995). The impact of apparent window dressing behavior 'on the evolution 
of operating and stock price performance of IPO firms is then assessed by 
testing for differences in the mean values of the variables employed between 
the two sub-samples. 
The results of the present paper depict that the window dressing hy-
pothesis is unable to explain the evolution of operating and imarket perform-
ance of IPO finns in Greece. In paliicuiar, it is found that smoothing behav-
I In reviewing the relevant literature Dechow et af. (1995) ackhowledge that the 
models developed for the detection of earnings management suff~r the disadvantage 
of the lack of a proper definition for discretionary accruals. On ~he other hand, in-
come smoothing is simply detected by comparing earnings variability to sales vari-
ability without having to classify accruals into discretionalY and :non-discretionaly. 
Schipper (1989) categorizes income smoothing as a special case' of earnings man-
agement but recognizes that some of the incentiws that give rise to income smooth-
ing apply equally to any form of eamings management. Therefor~, a reasonable as-
sumption made in the paper is that firms that attempt to smooth treir earnings have 
incentives for earnings management. However, a limitation of this approach is that 
there may be some companies that engage in other fomls of window dressing not 
detected by income smoothing methodology. 
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ior is not quite popular among Greek IPO firms. Pre-IPO profitability mar-
gins are sustained in the post-IPO period irrespective of whether firms dis-
play or not smoothing behavior. Moreover, the results indicate that there are 
no statistically significant differences in the mean values of operating and 
market performance measures of smoothing and non-smoothing firms. On 
the other hand, the resu lts reveal that the market performance of smoothing 
firms is more volatile than the respective of non-smoothing finns implying 
that the market is able to recognize smoothing behavior and categorizes 
smoothing firms into higher risk classes. Further results indicate that there 
are no differences in the size of the sample firms and in the values of the 
market-to-book ratio relating to income-smoothing behavior. Finally, it is 
shown that the changes in the operating performance have some information 
content for changes in the market performance of IPO firms. In this context it 
is also found that income smoothing, finn-size and market-to-book ratios 
display incremental explanatory power and thus are important in explaining 
the long-run stock price performance of IPO fi rms in Greece. 
The results of the paper appear to be interesting and bear implications for 
investors, managers and regulators. First, in the light of the recent upgrading 
of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) from an emerging to a mature market, 
the Greek capital market has attracted the attention of many European and 
international institutional and individual investors . The present paper casts 
new light on the . long-run performance of IPOs in Greece and therefore the 
results may of interest for European and international investors who consider 
investing in the ASE. 
Second, the results of the paper, along with the previous evidence on the 
performance of TPOs in Greece, show that empirical results derived from the 
US and UK institutional environments do not always apply to smaller and 
less developed markets. For example, previous Greek studies by Papaioan-
nou and Travlos (1995), Tsetsekos (1995), Papaioannou et al. (1997), Trav-
los (1997) and Papachristou (1998) report results, which do not fully support 
the window dressing hypothesis. In particular, these studies suggest that the 
high initial returns del ivered by IPO finns in Greece prevail because of sys-
tematic underpricing and not because of any over-reaction to past earnings 
growth. Moreover, Papaioannou et al. (1997), Travlos (1997) show that in 
the post-IPO period Greek firms maintain pre-IPO profit margins and they 
perform relatively well as compared to the market and to their industry coun-
terparts. 
Third, the paper provides direct evidence on income smoothing by Greek 
IPO firms . Although the findings of the previous Greek studies lean towards 
the perception that intentional window dressing behavior is unpopular among 
IPO firms, the lack of direct evidence on earnings management in Greece 
makes it difficult to assert that Greek IPO firms do not involve in window 
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dressing practices. Moreover, there are cases where certain events occasion-
ally signal window dressing behavior, especially to intemational investors 
who are unfamiliar with the Greek business environment. An example could 
be the case where a Greek firm applies for listing on a foreign market. In 
particular, some Greek firms decide to follow US GAAP in addition to the 
required Greek GAAP in order to gain the US SEC's approval to list their 
shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The prevailing difference 
in earnings under the two accounting systems can be thought as evidence of 
earnings management. Thus, US investors may not only be reluctant to hold 
shares of Greek firms but also they may exercise pressure to the SEC in order 
to impose more strict requirements for the listing of Greek firms on NYSE. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
the data set, develops the hypotheses to be tested and elaborates on some 
methodological issues. Section III presents the empirical results and analyzes 
their implications for investors, managers and regulators. Section IV summa-
rizes the major conclusions and expands on their implications for future re-
search. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. The data set 
The present paper examines a total of 38 new listings of industrial and 
commercial firms on the main and the parallel market of the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) during the three-year period from 1-1-1990 to 31-12-1992. 
The data set consists of financial statement information and share price in-
formation over a ten-year period, which plots around the actual IPO year 
(four years prior and five years after the actual IPO year). Data are collected 
from two different sources. For the pre-IPO period, which consists of four 
years, data are extracted from the initial offering prospectuses . For the post-
IPO period, which consists of the issuing year and five years hence, data are 
collected from the annual editions of the ASE. 
For each fi rm in the sample and for the entire ten-year period a set of fi-
nancial variables is calculated. These include net sales (NS), gross profit 
(GP), net operating profit after taxes (NOPA T), net profit (NP) and the ratio 
of NOPAT to net sales (NOPATINS) which is used as a measure of operat-
ing performance The decision to use net sales instead of total assets as the 
denominator of this ratio is motivated by the studies of Papaioannou et a\., 
(1997) and of Travlos (1997) who employ similar measures of operating per-
formance. In these atticles total assets are excluded because of fixed assets 
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revaluation, which makes unadjusted total assets difficult to compare across 
years. 
Share price information is available for a six-year period consisting of 
the IPO year and the subsequent five-year period . The variables falling in 
this category include the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity (MVE/BVE), the size of the firms which is measured as the total 
capital ization (share price times number of shares outstandidng) and the ratio 
of normalized excess value (NEV). MVE/BVE is used by Jain and Kini 
(1994) and by Travlos (1997) not only to explore the market performance of 
IPO firms but also to detect IPO underpricing. NEV is calculated as the dif-
ference between the fi rm ' s market value and its book value of total assets 
(denoted as Excess Value, EV) divided by the amount of net sales. The mar-
ket value of the firm is measured as the sum of the book values of total debt 
and preferred stock plus the market value of common equity. As Philippatos 
and Baird, III (1996) state, EV represents the capitalized value of the ex-
pected stream of future excess profit or loss arising when the fair market 
price of the company differs from the average value of the capital employed. 
EV is normalized by net sales in order to account for differences in size and 
the resulting ratio is denoted as NEV. This variable is used as a market per-
fonnance measure and is prefered over stock returns because it complies 
with value-based management. 
Some of the studies in the area examine whether changes in ownership 
structure affect the operating and market performance of the companies that 
go public. Changes in the ownership structure of a company are frequently 
measured by a variable, which refers to the after-market percentage of own-
ership maintained' by the stockholders who controlled the company prior to 
the IPO. This variable is oftenly denoted as ALPHA. In the context of the 
present study the $ame notation is also employed, and ALPHA is calculated 
for a six-year period indicating the changes in the ownership structure of 
each sample company resulting from subsequent issues of stock in the post-
IPO period. 
In calculating ,all variables the IPO year of every sample company was 
thought as year 0 and the time horizon of the study was plotted around this 
year. For example, the NOPAT!NS variable was calcu lated for a period of 
four years prior to! year 0 and for five years after (from year-4 to year +5). 
The rest of the variables, which concern market performance, were calcu-
lated for a six-year period, which consists of the IPO year and the five-year 
period following the IPO year (from year 0 to year +5). 
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2.2. Detecting Income Smoothing 
Income smoothing has been defined as the dampening of fluctuations 
about some level of earnings that is considered to be normal for a film 
(Beidleman, 1973; Barnea et aI., 1976; Belkaoui and Pi cur, 1984; Lambert, 
1984; and Albrecht and Richardson, 1990). Many empirical studies assert 
that income smoothing is motivated by a des ire of firms to enhance the pre-
dictability of future earnings. This explanation is justified by two distinct but 
not unrelated views. The first view states that management uses smoothing 
practices in order to maximize its utility and in order to convey its expecta-
tions to the users of financial statements (Barnea et aI. , 1976; Lambert, 1984; 
Moses, 1987; Beattie et aI., 1994; and Carlson and Bathala, 1997). The sec-
ond view asserts that management considers fluctuations in income and un-
predictable earnings to be the causal determinants of systematic risk (Lev 
and Kunitzky, 1974; Trueman and Titman, 1988; Beattie et aI., 1994; 
Michelson et al., 1995; and Booth et aI., 1996). 
One approach to study the existence of income smoothing is by compar-
ing the variability of various definitions of income to the variability of sales. 
This method was initiated by Eckel (1981) and has also been employed in a 
number of subsequent studies (Albrecht and Richardson, 1990; Michelson et 
aI., 1995; Booth et aI. , 1996; and Carlson and Bathala, 1997). Under this ap-
proach a firm is classified as an income smoother if the ratio: 
< 1 
Where: CV = coefficient of variation (standard deviation/expected value) 
calculated over the entire ten year period. 
illt = change in income from period t··1 to period t, and 
ilSt = change in sales from period t-I to period t. 
Michelson et aI., (1995) use various definitions of income in order to 
identify different smoothing instruments and result in three different models 
of detecting income smoothing. A variant of this approach is also followed 
here, by using three different definitions of income: gross profit (GP), net 
operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) and net profit (NP). With three defini-
tions of income the smoothing ratio can be calculated in three different ways. 
Therefore, sample films can be categorized as income smoothers and non-
smoothers under three different models: 
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Modell: A finn is classified as an income smoother if at least one of the 
three smoothing ratios lies between zero and one. 
Model 2: A firm is classified as an income smoother if at least two of the 
three smoothing ratios lie between zero and one. 
Model 3: A finn is classified as an income smoother if all three smooth-
ing ratios lie between zero and one. 
It is evident that by moving from model 1 to model 3 the conditions for 
classifying a finn as an income smoother become more restrictive. The intui-
tive appeal of this method is that if smoothing is a common practice among 
sample finns, the nurnber of smoothers can be reduced to those that system-
atically engage in income smoothing by moving from one model to another 
that is by setting more restrictive requirements. 
2.3. Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach followed in the present paper goes down 
two paths. The first path concerns the evolution of the performance of IPQ 
firms over the selected time horizon, and the question as to whether there are 
any systematic differences in the average performance of income smoothers 
and non-smoothers. Moreover, prevailing differences are compared to differ-
ences in size, MVE/BVE and ALPHA in order to assess potential intelTela-
tions among variables. Having classified sample films into smoothers and 
non-smoothers summary statistics are obtained for each one of the two sub-
samples and for the original sample as a whole. In pmticular, T-tests and F-
Tests are performed in order to investigate whether the variables computed 
for smoothers and non-smoothers present significant differences in the mean 
values and in the variance respectively. This approach enables to recognize 
whether finns gain advantages from involving into smoothing activities and 
whether the market properly accounts for this behavior. 
The second path uses regression analysis to examine whether changes in 
the market perfcllmance of IPQ fi1111S are driven by changes in the operating 
perfonnance and by the finns' smoothing behavior. In this context, six addi-
tional variables are utilized: f..NEV, which represents the one-period change 
in NEV; f..PERF, which represents the one-period change in the ratio of 
NQPATINS; f..ALPHA, which represents the one period change in ALPHA; 
ISM, which is a dummy variable for income smoothing that takes the value 
of 1 when the finn is classified as an income smoother, and 0 otherwise; MB, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value of I for high NIVEIBVE (low 
BVE/MVE) firms and zero otherwise; and SIZE, which is a dummy variable 
for size that takes the value of 1 for small size finns (below median capitali-
zation) and the value of 0 otherwise. The various regression models run have 
f..NEV as their dependent variable. The rest of the variables described are 
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used as explanatory variables and vary across the models. the three dummy 
variables are multiplied by L\PERF in order to assess their incremental in-
formation content for L\NEV over L\PERF. 
The purpose of the regression analysis is to see whether income smooth-
ing affects the performance of IPOs in the market and whether changes in 
NEV create incentives for managers to involve in window dressing practices. 
Moreover, the regression analysis reveals whether firm-size and book-to-
market ratios explain the perfonnance of IPOs in the maljket and whether 
their explanatory power encompasses the respective of income smoothing. 
Finally, the regressions perforn1ed help explaining whether and to which ex-
tend the market's pricing mechanism adjusts in the post-IPO period for con-
tinuing smoothing behavior. 
3. Analysis of the Results 
3.1. Findings on Income Smoothing 
The three alternative smoothing ratios described in the 'Previous section 
are calculated for all sample finns and over the entire ten-year period. The 
results indicate that income smoothing is not very popular among Greek 
firms. Less than one third of the sample firms (12 out of 38 companies) are 
found to classify as smoothers under Model l, only three companies under 
Model 2, and just one company under Model 3. Moreover, it is found that ten 
out of the twelve fi nns that qualify as income smoothers under Model l pre-
fer to smooth gross profit rather than any other definition of income. This 
latter finding bears important implications for the factors that motivate Greek 
finns to engage in income smoothing. Clearly it appears that reducing the 
variability in operating or net earnings cannot be thought as the strongest 
incentive for earnings management in Greece. Given that the Greek account-
ing system is tax oriented, a potential incentive for earnings management 
could be the reduction or the deferring of tax obl igations. The finding that 
gross profit prevails as the most prefelTed smoothing instrument indicates 
that Greek firms try to reduce the variability in sales and cost of goods sold 
potentially in order to smooth periodic V A T payments. Thus, a preliminary 
implication of the present paper is that the Greek IRS should enforce a tax 
audit system that emphasizes on a more strict inspection of the early stages 
of income calculation (i.e., revenue recognition, inventory valuation, depre-
ciation expense). 
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3.2. Findings on the Operating Pefjormance of JPO firms 
This sub-section reports results on the operating performance of IPO 
firms for a period extending from four years prior to five years after the IPO 
year. As previously stated, the measure of operating perfonnance is the ratio 
of NOPAT/NS. 
Table 1: The 10-year Evolution of Operating Performance Around IPO 
year (Denoted as Year 0). 
l. Smoothers (12 companies) 
Year -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 16.512 19.989 19.779 20. 186 22.072 22.437 18.711 19.355 17.984 18.034 
Std. Error 1.651 2.434 2.433 1.818 1.894 2.332 2.576 5.584 2.514 20.821 
Median 17.556 19.812 22.492 21.377 23. 156 23.897 20.635 22.846 19.483 18.242 
Std. De" 5.745 8.477 8.431 6.298 6.562 8.077 8.924 8.95 1 8.709 9.773 
Skewness -0.863 -0.392 -0.483 -1.594 -1.686 -0.913 -0.986 -1.309 -1.028 -0.336 
KU110sis 0.586 '0.489 0.145 3.1 96 3.604 0.822 0.913 0.997 0.610 -0.217 
2. Non-Smoothers (26 companies) 
Year -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 16.852 18. 162 18.078 17.994 18.942 18.4 14 17.863 17.904 16.305 15.075 
Std. En'Of 1.208 1.299 1.132 1.308 1.350 1.329 1.192 1.006 1.334 1.115 
Med ian 16.377 18.101 18.60 1 16.815 19.557 17.545 17.560 17.594 16. 107 15.518 
Std. Dev 7.446 8.011 6.975 6.668 6.883 6.777 6.077 5.132 6.800 5.684 
Skewness 0.592 0.576 -0.087 0.139 0.201 0.614 0.355 0.265 -!~ 0.481 
--
KuI10sis 0.652 0.823 -0.338 -0.940 ··0.512 -0.011 -0.444 0.043 0.246 0.765 
3. All (38 companies) 
Year -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 16.852 ) 8.162 18.078 18.686 19.930 19.648 18.131 18.362 16.835 16.009 
Std. Error 1208 1.299 1.1 32 1.063 1.11 2 1.1 92 1.133 1.052 1.197 1.1 72 
Median 16.377 18.101 IK601 18.942 21.430 19.549 18.374 18.395 17.720 16.257 
Std. Dev 7.446 8.011 6.975 6.550 6.854 7.349 6.985 6.487 7.377 7.223 
-
Skewness 0.592 0.576 -0'()87 .. 0.306 -0.286 0.125 -0.3 18 -0.632 -0.457 0.255 
Kurtosis 0.652 0.823 -0.338 ·0.629 -0.465 -0.590 0.260 0.729 0.018 0.312 
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4. T -test for differences in Ithe mean values between the smoothers and 
non-smoothers sub-samples 
Year -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F·test [po 1.037 0.326 1.566 0.747 0.879 0.227 l.l74 4.492* (JAlO 3.908" 
values] [0.315] [0.571] [0.219] [0.393] [0.355] [0.637] [0.286J [0.041J [0.526] [0.056] 
T·test [p- -0.215 0.925 0.913 0.978 1.346 1.499 0.299 0.636 0.590 1.180 
values] [0.831] [0.366] [0.374] [O.338J [0.192] [0.151] [0.796] [0.529] [0.563] [0.264] 
Notes: Numbers are rounded to deCimal pomts. 
The F-statistic tests for the equality of variances between the two sub-
samples. The T -statistic tests for the equality of means between the two sub-
samples. 
*indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
**indicates that the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected at the 10% 
level of significance. 
The results of Table 1, concerning the total of the fi rms in the sample, 
reveal a slight increase in the operating performance around the IPO year, 
however, pre-IPO profitability margins are sustained for at least three years 
after the initial offering. The operating performance begins to deteriorate in 
year 4 and this trend is also apparent in year 5. Similar results are also ob-
served for the non-smoothers sub-sample. Smoothing firms, however, dis-
play a somehow different pattern of operating performance. An increasing 
tendency in the NOPATINS ratio is observed in the pre-IPO period, which 
terminates one year after the IPO year. After that the operating perfonnance 
drops to lower levels and is maintained to these levels with slight ups and 
downs. Although the values of both the mean and the median show that 
smoothers perform better than non-smoothers in all of the years of the study, 
the results of the t-tests show that there are no significant differences in the 
mean values of NO PAT INS between the two sub-samples. 
The results of Table 1 indicate that the 'window dressing' hypothesis, as 
expressed by Jain and Kini (1994), is not able to explain the evolution of the 
operating perfornmnce of IPO firms in Greece. The results reported here are 
in accordance with those of Papaioannou et aI., (1997) and Travlos (1997) 
who argue that IPO firms in Greece sustain their pre-IPO profit margins for 
at least three years after the IPO year. The fact that in the IPO year operating 
performance is somewhat overstated as compared to the previous years, can-
not be attributed to earnings management, since the same pattern is observed 
for both smoothing and non-smoothing firms. An explanation that better con-
forms to the results reported here could be that of Beaver et af (2000) who 
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argue that the decision to go public relates to factors such as peak in sales 
and earnings growth. 
Jain and Kini (1994) also argue that the operating performance relates to 
the percentage of ownership control, which is maintained after the initial of-
fering. In particular, they claim that finns, which maintain high ownership 
control, are more . likely to conform to shareholder wealth maximization prin-
ciples and therefore these films are motivated to deliver high operating re-
sults. 
TABLE 2: The6-year Evolution of the ALPHA in thePort-IPO Period 
1. Smoothers (12 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
-
Mean 77.833 76.750 74.333 65.333 60.083 57.583 
Std. Error 0.727 1.226 3.071 4.822 5.736 5.944 
Med ian 77.500 77.500 77.500 72.000 68.500 58.500 
Sld.Dev 2.5l.7 4.245 10.637 16.702 19.870 20.590 
-
Skewness 0. 143 -1.092 -2 .7 11 -1.449 -0.839 -0.666 
Kurtosis -0.92 1 1.267 7.963 1.629 -0.726 -0.682 
2. Non··Smoothers (26 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 78. 192 76.769 76.500 72.385 70.615 67 .846 
Std. Error 0.582 1.218 1.219 1.836 1.894 2. 596 
Median 78.000 78.000 78.000 75.500 75.000 71.500 
Std.Dev 2.967 6.212 6.218 9.364 9.659 13.238 
Skc\vness 0.275 -2.234 -2.1 03 -1.1 01 -0.750 -1.541 
Kurtos is 0.068 6.210 5.734 0.496 -0.61 6 3.397 
3. All (38 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 78.079 76.763 75 .816 70. 158 67.299 64.605 
Std.Error 0.455 0.909 1.265 2.008 2.323 2.655 
Median 78 .000 78.000 78.000 75.000 72.500 68.500 
Std.Dev 2.803 5.606 7.798 12.378 14.3 19 16.365 
Skewness 0.272 -2 .123 -2.717 -1.709 - 1.459 -1.267 
Kurtos is ·0.086 6.132 8.844 3.369 1.900 1.198 
-
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4. T -test for differences in the mean values between thesmoothers and 
non-smoothers sub-samples 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F-tesl 0.253 0.259 1.434 4.815' 12.71 4' 3.346** 
[p-value] [O.618J [0.6 14J [0.23 9] [0.035J [O.OOIJ [0.076] 
T-test -0.386 -0.01 1 -0.656 -1.671 -2.21 6 -1.582 
[p-valuel [0.703] [0.99 1] [0.522J [0 .103] [0.033] [0.072] 
Notes: Numbers are rounded to three decimal points 
The F-statistic tests for the equality of variances between the two sub-
samples. The T-statistic tests for the equality of means between the two sub-
samples. 
*indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
**indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is re-
jected at the 10% level of significance. 
This argument is examined here by looking at the evolution of the AL-
PHA variable for smoothing and non-smoothing firms and for a period of six 
years (from year 0 to year 5). These results appear in Table 2 and evidence 
significant differences in the percentage of ownership control only in years 4 
and 5. The yearly evolution of the ALPHA variable exhibits a declining pat-
tern for all sample firms. The percentage of ownership control drops with a 
slow pace in years 1 and 2 and with a faster pace in years 3 to 5. Moreover, 
in years 4 and 5 the pace is faster for smoothing firms than for non-
smoothing firms implying that in the long run, the size of the subsequent to 
the IPO equity offerings is related to the finns' window dressing behavior. 
Taken together the results of Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there is no rela-
tion between operating performance and percentage of ownership control in 
the sense that finns, which maintain higher ownership control, do not deliver 
higher profitability margins. Moreover, the firms' smoothing behavior relates 
to the percentage of ownership control but bears no implications in terms of 
operating pelformance. 
3.3. Findings on the Market Performance IPO Firms 
This sub-section examines whether firm size, MVE/BVE and NEV are 
affected by the firms' decis ion to smooth income streams. The aim is to ex-
amine whether the performance of lPOs in the market reflects investors ' ex-
pectations about future profitability and whether the market anticipates 
smoothing behavior. 
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Table 3: The 6-year Evolution of Market Capitalization (Size) in the 
Post-·IJl>O Period (in thousands of EllIros) 
l.Smoothers (12 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 41,644.90 35,376.61 28,626.80 49,366.34 43,663 .98 40,851.06 
Std. Error 22,038.41 18,760.84 14,572.69 18,440.92 15,370.05 12,526.74 
Median 18,792.37 13,73 1.47 15,263.39 17,640.49 25,154 .81 29,9 10.49 
Std. Dev 76,343 .30 64 ,989 .46 50,481.26 63 ,880.4 1 53,243.43 43,393 .90 
Skewness 3.346 3.342 3.118 1.651 1.896 1.652 
Kurtosis 11.406 11.375 10. 117 1.466 2.556 1.776 
2.Noll-Smoothers (26 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
--
Mean 40,199.87 44 ,653.41 44,902.77 53,224.12 61 ,5 13.95 59,397.04 
Std. Error 12,681.16 18,458.38 17,846.58 18,938.36 30,093.91 30,570.71 
- ----
Median 17,644.90 12,86 1.34 13,599.41 19,~73 .59 18,724.87 15,558.33 
Std. Dev 64,661.48 94,119.65 91,000.09 96,973.59 153,449.5 1 155,880.64 
Skewness 3.045 3.660 3.748 3.098 4.500 4.605 
Kurtos is 9.533 14.472 15.436 9.992 21.385 22.226 
3. All (38 companies) 
-------
Year 0 1 2: 3 4 5 
Mean 40,656.14 41 ,723.90 39,762.99 52,005.87 55,877.12 53,540.39 
Std. Error 10,952.38 13,822.42 12,989.56 14,065.00 21,040.98 21 , 184.80 
Med ian 17,644 .90 13,731.47 14,928.83 18,994.86 20,937.64 17,914.89 
Std. Dev 67,514.98 85,207 .10 80.072.99 86,702.51 129,705.30 130,591.87 
Skewness 3.030 3.648 3.951 3.012 5.055 5.297 
Kurtosis 866.1 14.798 17.775 10.098 28.068 30.299 
4.T-test for differences in the mean values between the smoothers and 
non-smoothen! sub-samples 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
--
F-test [p- 0.008 (J.464 0.747 0.154 0.733 1.035 
valuesJ [O .92~] [0.500] [0.393] 0.697]. [0.397] [0.31 6J 
T-test [p- 0.61 0 -0.308 -0.577 -0.126 -0.390 -0.402 
va lues] [0.952] [0.760] [0.567] [0.901] [0.699J [0.690] 
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Notes: Numbers are rounded to three decimal points. 
The F-statistic tests for the equality of variances between the two sub-
samples. The T -statistic tests for the equality of means between the two sub-
samlpes. 
*indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means rejected at 
the 5% level of significance. 
**indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is re-
jected at the 10% level of significance. 
Table 3 displays the yearly evolution of market capitaiization (size) of 
IPO firms over the five-year period following the IPO year. The results de-
pict that in years 1 and 2 there are no significant changes in finn size as 
compared to the IPO year. The size of the sample firms increases signifi-
cantly in year 3 and remains approximately at the same levels in years 4 and 
5. Moreover, the t-tests suggest that there are no significant diJJerences in the 
evolution of firm size between smoothers and non-smoothers. The results of 
Table 3 are consistent with those of Table 2 and suggest that the observed 
increase in finn size in year 3 may be attributed to new issues of equity 
stock. The subsequent issues of stock in years 4 and 5 are not as large as the 
respective of year 3 and thus bear no incremental effects on finn size. 
Table 4 tabulates the yearly evolution of the MVEfBVE ratio. In the case 
of non-smoothing firms the results indicate that MVE/BVE is quite high in 
year 0 but decreases gradually throughout the rest of the period. In the case 
of smoothing finns , however, the results indicate a slightly different pattern 
of the of MVE/BVE ratio. The mean value of MVE/BVE is at high levels in 
year 0 and deteriorates in years 1 and 2. The ratio increases significantly in 
year 3 and then falls down to lower levels in years 4 and 5. Moreover, in year 
3, the results of the t-test suggest that the observed difference in the mean 
value of MVE/BVE between smoothers and non-smoothers is marginally 
significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, the respective results of the 
F-test indicate significant differences in variance implying that the values of 
the MVE/BVE ratio of smoothing finns are more volatile than the respective 
of non-smoothing firms. 
TABLE 4: T he 6-year Evolution of Market Value of Equity to Book 
Value of Equity (MVE/BVE) 
l.Smoothers (12 companies) 
4 5 
1.791 1.373 
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Std. EITor 0.524 0.400 0.320 0.754 0.298 0.188 
Median 3.295 2.269 1.492 1.595 2.047 1.531 
Std. Dev. 1.814 1.385 LOll 2.613 1.032 0.652 
._. 
Skewness 0.820 1.537 0.347 1.054 -0.193 -0.804 
Kurtosis 0.534 3.016 -0.816 -0.558 -0.850 0.171 
2. Non-Smoothers (26 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 2.803 2.153 1.842 1.811 1.659 1.418 
Std. EITor 0.289 0.267 0.240 0.199 0.204 0.177 
Median 2.235 1.671 1.503 1.691 1.407 1.281 
Std. Dev 1.472 1.407 1.222 1.013 1.039 0.904 
Skewness 1.097 1.552 1.274 1.072 1.512 2.227 
Kurtosis 1.321 2.734 0.968 2.071 3.032 5.487 
3. AU (38 companiies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 3.029 2.271 1.823 2.120 1.701 lA03 
Std. EITol' 0.259 0.226 0.190 0.278 0.166 0.134 
Median 2.690 1.804 !.S03 1.640 1.471 1.430 
Std. Dev 1.599 1.392 1.172 1.713 1.025 0.824 
Skc\vness 0.999 1.437 1.035 1.860 0.981 1.854 
Kurtosis 0.796 2.157 0.537 3.345 1.462 5.285 
4. T -test for differences in the mean values between the smoothers and 
non-smoothers sub-samples. 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
- i--- -
F-test 0.666 0.075 0.005 16.579* 0.274 0.050 
[p-value) [0.420) [0.786) [0.942) [0.0(0) [0.6(4) [0.824] 
.. 
T-test 1.201 0.771 -0. 150 1.676*' 0.367 -0. 173 
[p-value] [0.245) __ [0.449] [0.882] [0.102] [0.717) [0.864] 
Notes: Numbers are rounded to three decimal points 
The F-statistic tests for the equality of variances between the two sub-
samples. The T-statistic tests for the equality of means between the two sub-
samples. 
*indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
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**indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is re-
jected at the 10% level of significance. 
In overall the results indicate that IPO firms deliver high stock retums 
during the IPO year. The market performance of non-smoothing firms exhib-
its a downward trend throughout the five-year period . On the other hand, the 
performance of smoothing fi rms shows a significant increase in year 3, 
which is accompanied by a decrease in the ALPHA variable, and by an in-
crease in the size variable implying that new equity issues have taken place 
during this year. Under a general perspective the results are consistent with 
the IPa under-performance evidence. A slight deviation lies in the fact that 
in the early post-IPa period smoothing firms conduct subsequent equity is-
sues which appear to yield high returns during the issuing year. In the period 
following the issuing year, however, the performance of smoothing firms 
displays a downward trend which may be taken to imply that subsequent to 
the IPa equity issues also under-perform in the long-run. 
Table 5: the 6-year Evolution of the ratio of Normalized Excess Value 
[(MV-BV)/Sales} 
l.Smoothers (12 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 1.939 0.884 -0.192 1.879 0.1 17 0.109 
Std. Error 0.540 0.217 0.639 1.506 1.008 0.447 
Median 1.592 0.670 0.187 0 .351 0.425 0.328 
Std. Dev 1.869 0.750 2.2 13 5.218 3.491 1.548 
_. 
Skewness 1.248 0.657 -3.058 1.153 -2.454 -2.188 
_. 
Kwtosis 0.737 -0.883 10.114 2.322 7.657 6.282 
2.Non-Smoothers (26 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 1.006 0.603 0.484 0.482 0.360 0.1 93 
Std . EtTOr 0.171 0. 153 
.-
0.139 0.104 0.111 0.093 
Median 0.788 0.303 0.232 0.483 0.344 0.13 3 
Std. Dev 0.871 0.779 0.710 0.528 0.566 0.474 
-
Skewness 1.591 1.625 0.897 -0.041 0.564 1.870 
Kurtosis 3.086 2.166 -0.307 - 1.259 1.544 4.786 
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3. All (38 companies) 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 1.301 0.692 0.271 0.923 0.283 0.167 
-
Std. Error 0.2 14 0. 125 0.224 0.479 0. 318 0.1 51 
Median 0.817 0.419 0.217 0.467 0. 344 0,142 
Std. Dev 1.32 1 0.772 1.378 2.952 1.963 0.931 
c--. 
Skewness 1.959 1.235 -3.971 2.616 -3.846 -2.619 
Kurtosis 4.165 0.727 21.534 12.350 21.774 13.805 
4. T-test differences in the mean values between smoothers and non-
smoothers sub-samples 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 
F-test [p- 6.726' 0.050 9.672' 9.270' 10.237 9.767' 
valu es] [0.014] r---l~.825] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
I-test [p- 2.117' 1.061 -1.509 -0.908 -1.374 - 1.362 
values] [0.041 ] [0.300] [0.1 40] [0.370] [0.178] [0. 182] 
Notes: Numbers are rounded to decimal points. 
The F- statistic tests for the equality of variances between the two sub-
samples. The t-statistic tests for the equality of means between the two sub-
samples. 
*indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
**ind icates that the null hypothesis of equal variances or means is re-
jected at the 10% level of signi ficance. 
The yearly evolution of the NEV variable is tabulated in Table 5. The 
pattern of NEV shares many commonali ties with the MVE/BVE pattern. In 
particular, non··smoothing firms deliver high values ofNEV in year 0, which 
deteriorate throughout the rest of the period. Smoothing films display high 
values of NEV in year 0, which decline in years 1 and 2, increase in year 3 
and fall to lower levels in years 4 and 5. A rather interesting aspect is that the 
results of the t-test fa il to reject the hypothesis of equal means during year 3. 
This implies that in terms of excess value, smoothing firms gain no system-
atic advantages over non-smoothers when conducting subsequent to the IPO 
equity issues. On the other hand, the results of the t-test indicate significant 
differences in year 0 implying that smoothers perform better than non-
smoothers during the IPO year. However, the results of the F-test show that 
the pattern of NEV for smoothing fi rms is more vo latile than that of 110n-
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smoothers in almost every year (except year 1). Thus, it may be that smooth-
ers deliver higher returns in year 0 because they are classified into higher risk 
classes and not because of any investors' oveneaction to past earnings 
growth. 
3.4. Regression Results 
The results observed in the previous sub-section are also tested in a re-
gression analysis framework. Eleve:n alternative regression models investi-
gate on the factors that affect the market perfonnance of IPO finns. In all 
models, the dependent variable is .1.NEVt, which refers to the year-by-year 
change in NEV. Five explanatory variables are used interchangeably to con-
struct the various models. These variables are: LlPERF\, which refers to the 
annual change in operating perfonnance and is expected to have a positive 
sign; ISM! which is a dummy variable for income smoothing that takes the 
value of 1 when the finn is classifi ed as an income smoother and 0 other-
wise; LlALPHAt which is the yearly change in ALPHA and reflects the per-
centage of ownership transmitted to the public through successive equity 
issues in the post-IPO period; SIZE t is a dummy variable for size that takes 
the value of 1 for small size films (below median capitalization) and 0 oth-
erwise; and MB t is a dummy variable that takes the value of l for high mar-
ket-to-book (low book-to-market) ratios and 0 otherwise. In all cases the 
dummy variables are multiplied by LlPERF t to investigate their incremental 
information content over operating perfonnance. 
TABLE 6: Regressions of Changes in the Market Performance and Various Explanatory Variables 
Model Intercept A PERF 
ISM* SIZE* MB* Adjusted R] Durbin-Watson F- Statistic N -I AALPHA 
LlPEPF LlPERF LlPEPF Statistic 
! -0.048 0.485* 0.056 1.999 12.059* 190
1 (-0.091) (3.473) [0.001] i 
2 -0.127 0.009 1.157* 0.1 38 2.094 16.069* 190 i 
(-0.251) (0.049) (4.351) [0.000] I 
3 0.1 73 0.489* -0.067 0.062 I 1.998 7.217* 190 (0.318) (3 .511) (-1.514) [O.OO!] 
4 -0.053 I 0.097 0.599* 0.072 2.054 8.3 86* 190 
(-0.101) i (0.423) (2.118) [0.000] 
5 0.011 ! 0.739* I -0.665* 0.078 1.971 9.033* 190 
(0.021 ) I (4.242) i ( -2.388) I [0.000] 
6 0.045 I 0.022 I 1.129* -0.052 I 0.140 I 2.089 11.229* 190 (0.086) , (0.133) I (4.236) I (- i.212) [0.000] 
7 -0.1 30 -0.351 1.141 * 0.566* 0.153 2.132 12.361 * 190 
(-0.261) (-1.445) (4.327) (2.089) [0.000] 
8 -0.064 0.274 1.206* -0.748* 0.168 2.058 13.762 190 
( -0.129) ( 1.413) (4.611) ( -2.820) [0.000] 
9 0.034 -0.331 1.114* -0.049 0.557* 0 .154 2.127 9.627* 190 
(0.065) (-1.364) (4.216) (-1.163) (2.058) [0.000] 
10 0.10 1 0.053 1.162* -0.053 0.311 -0.641 * 0.172 2.085 8.870* 190 
(0.198) (0.180) (4.429) (-1.264) (1.074) (-2.238) [0.000] 
Model Intercept t1PERF ISM* AALPHA SIZE* 
APEPF t1PERF 
MB* 
Adjusted R2 
t1PEPF 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
F- Statistic N 
.II 
I 
-0.076 0.024 1.189* I 0.326 -0.626* 0.169 I 
2.087 10.653* 190 I I (-0.154) (0.08 1) (4.540) I (1.126) (-2.1 85) [0.000] 
Notes: Regression resu lts for changes in the normalized excess value (iJNEV) against five explanatory variables for the 
pooled sample of 190 observations (38 companies for a five-year period). The explanatory variables are: iJPEPF which 
represents changes in the operating perfonnance; ISM which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the com-
pany is classified as an income smoother, and the value of 0 when the company is classified as non-smoother; LJALPHA 
represents changes in ownership structure; SIZE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for small-size firms and 0 
otherwise; and MB is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for high MVEIBVE companies and the value of 0 for low 
MVEIBVE companies. The dummy variables used in the respective models are multiplied by LJPERF so as to investigate 
whether changes in the operating perfonnance of smoothing finns , small firms and high .MVEIBVE finns have incremental 
explanatory power for the changes in market perfonnance.The t-values are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates (t-value). The p-values are reported in brackets [p-value]. 
*indicates significance at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 5 reports tht: results of the eleven regression models. Models 1 to 5 
evaluate the information content of ~PERFt, ISMb ~ALPHAb SIZEt and 
MBt for ~NEVt. Modell depicts that changes in operating perfonnance ex-
plain changes in market performance. The low value of adjusted R-square 
however, indicates that the market utilizes other sources of information in 
forming security prices. Model 2 suggests that smoothing behavior bears 
incremental infonnation content over changes in operating performance. It 
appears that the market places more emphasis on the operating performance 
of smoothing firms rather than on the operating performance of non-
smoothing finns. This may be taken to imply that changes in the operating 
performance of non-smoothing firms are expected and therefore impounded 
in share prices. On the other hand, changes in the operating perfonnance of 
smoothing finns appear to be unexpected since they exhibit significant in-
formation content for changes in the market performance. Thus, it appears 
that the market anticipates income-smoothing behavior and does not im-
pound expectations about future earnings in current years' stock prices. 
Model 3 suggests that the information content of changes in the ownership 
structure is encompassed by the information content of ~PERF. Models 4 
and 5 depict that the size of the fi rms and the market to book ratio bear sig-
nificant incremental information content over ~PERF in explaining changes 
in market performance. Moreover, the sign of MB is found to be negative 
implying that changes in the market perfomlance are positively correlated to 
book-to-market ratios (the inverse ofMB). 
In models 6 to 11 L\PERF and ISM are examined in combination with the 
rest of the explanatory variables. In all cases ~PERF is found to be insignifi-
cant while ISM is found to be significant. Models 6, 9 and 10 depict that 
~ALPHA is insignificant and bears no infornlation content over the rest of 
the explanatory variables. Models 8, 10 and 11 suggest that the MB ratio is a 
significant explanatory variable and that its infonnation content is not en-
compassed by any of the rest variables. 
A rather surprising result concerns the explanatory power of size. It ap-
pears that size has incremental explanatory power when considered together 
with ~PERF and ISM (models 7 and 9). However, models 10 and 11 show 
that the explanatory power of size is overlapped by the information content 
of MB. The observable implication is that in explaining the performance of 
IPO finns in Greece the book-to-market ratio is a better explanatory variable 
than size. 
In overall the results suggest that ISM and MB explain the performance 
of IPOs in Greece implying that the market classifies IPQ firms into risk 
classes according to income smoothing behavior and book to market ratios. 
Thus, income smoothing and book-to-market ratios are the two factors that 
explain the long-run underperformance oflPOs in Greece. 
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4. Summary and Implications 
This article examines whether window dressing practices affect IPQ 
valuation in the Greek Stock Market. Income smoothing methodology is 
used to account for window dressing behavior among Greek IPQ firms. This 
enables the classification of sample fi rms into two separate sub-samples of 
smoothers and non-smoothers. For each one of the two sub-samples the evo-
lution of operating and market performance is examined over a period of ten 
years around the initial offering year. 
The results are consistent with those of Papaioannou et aI., (1997) and of 
Travlos (1997) and depict that IPQ firms in Greece manage on average to 
sustain their profitabil ity margins for at least three years after the initial of-
fering year. Smoothers perform better than non-smoothers, however, non-
smoothers exhibit a more stable eamings pattem in the post-IPQ period. Fur-
thermore, non-smoothers maintain higher percentages of ownership for a 
period of three years after the IPQ year implying an inclination to share-
holder wealth maximization principles. This enables them to signal their 
quality to the market in order to achieve better prices to subsequent equity 
issues. Qn the other hand, it is found that smoothers conduct subsequent to 
the IPQ equity issues in earlier years than non-smoothers. However, despite 
the fact that smoothers deliver higher returns, on average they do not appear 
ab le to gain systematic advantages. The market is found to be able to antici-
pate smoothing behavior and in general, classifies smoothers into higher risk 
classes. 
In the context of the regression analysis the results suggest that changes 
in operating perfOlmance capture much of the variability in the market per-
formance of IPO fi rms in Greece. The information content of accounting 
profitability is improved when a dummy variable for intentional smoothing is 
included. This variable potentially accounts for omitted risk factors in the 
model and shows that the market anticipates future intentional smoothing 
behavior. Moreover, size and book-to-market ratios exhibit incremental in-
formation content in explaining the market performance of IPQ firms in 
Greece, although the information content of size is encompassed by the re-
spective content of the book-to-market ratio. 
The results reported in the present paper bear some implications for the 
behavior of the Greek IPOs market. It appears that the over-reaction hy-
pothesis cannot properly explain the evolution of the performance of Greek 
IPQ firms. It is more likely that the observed high initial returns are due to 
systematic IPQs underpricing rather than to investors' over-reaction to past 
earnings growth. A poten tial explanation is that IPQ firms in Greece use un-
derpricing as a mechanism to signal their quality to the market. Smoothing 
firms, which exhibit superior operating performance underprice their stock to 
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a greater extend than non-smoothing finns. Thus, if operating performance 
represents finn qual ity, then the existence of a positive relation between un-
derpricing and changes in operating performance is consistent with the sig-
naling explanation for underpricing (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt 
and Hawng, 1989). Additional evidence supporting the underpricing explana-
tion, namely, that high-quality firms underprice their stock at the IPO and 
subsequently conduct SEOs when the market prices are established and there 
has been an opportunity for information revelat ion, is provided by Tsanga-
rakis (1993), Papaioannou et aI., (1 997) and Travlos (1997). In particular, 
Tsangarakis (1993) evidences that SEOs in Greece do not yield abnonnal 
returns on the ex-rights day. On the other hand, Papaioannou et aI. , (1 997) 
and Travlos (1997) fail to suppOli the predicted market correction to abnor-
mal returns in the post-IPO period by evidencing that IPO tinns in the long 
run perfonn relatively well as compared to the market and to their industry 
counterparts. 
In addition, inferences on over-reaction cannot be drawn solely on the 
basis of realized returns but require due consideration of the prevailing ri sk-
return relation. The findings of the present paper indicate that smoothers de-
liver higher returns because they fall into higher risk classes. On the other 
hand no evidence of over-reaction is apparent to non-smoothing firms which 
fall into lower risk classes. Thus, the reported results not only do they fail to 
support over-reaction but they depict that the predicted risk-return relation 
holds up relatively well in all cases. 
The results of this paper also bear implications for both investors and fi-
nancial analysts. First, it appears that new issues in the Greek Stock Market 
provide opportunities for portfolio investments, which deliver returns that 
adequately compensate for the underlying degree of risk. Moreover, the de-
gree of undeq)ricing may signal opportunities for alternative strategies of 
portfol io fonnation. The higher is the extent of underpricing the higher is the 
possibility that the issuing firm exhibits smoothing behavior. In the early 
post-IPO period smoothers provide superior performance and transmit high 
percentages of ownership to the publ ic. It may thus, appear that smoothers' 
shares are appropriate for investors who pursue trading strategies. On the 
other hand, non-smoothing firms underprice their stock to lesser extents and 
their shares are deemed appropriate for investors who follow buy and hold 
strategies because they are likely to display an inclination to shareholder 
wealth maximization principles. 
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